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One of the most importantarenasof the fermentin contemporaryArab social thought
is Egypt. Egyptian writers have been contributingto a rapidly growing body of literatureon state and society. Its themes include methodological issues, the natureof the
ideal Islamic society; the elite-mass gap; the state'srole in public life; the appropriate
model for socioeconomic development; and the social bases of Islamist movements.
One dimension of contemporaryArab social thought has received less attention
and merits furtherdiscussion. One is struckby the dialectic between the purposes of
scripturalistsand their utilization of modern concepts to promote traditionalistobjectives; similarly, modernists, influenced by ideas of foreign provenance, feel compelled to try to reach their goals by reference to early kalam.' Seemingly, those
debating "whither Arab society" take either of two very general perspectives: one
that proposes solutions to the currentproblems of state and society by means of an
ahistorical emphasis on the timeless truths of received religious knowledge; or a
second that adopts a more critical attitude toward tradition, while nonetheless utilizing some of its concepts and working these into historically grounded analysis.
It is the capturing of this dialectic of scripturalistand modernist discourses that
serves as the basic justification of this paper. Two contemporarywriters seem to be
prominent representatives, respectively, of scripturalist and modernist positions:
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and Hasan Hanafi (b. 1935). Other Egyptian writers are importantin this context, but I will examine the thought of these two in particular.Qutb
has been the subject of several studies, including but not limited to those of Ibrahim M. Abu-RabiC,LeonardBinder,MuhammadHafiz Diyab, Yvonne Haddad,Gilles
Kepel, AhmadMoussali, CAdnanMusallam, and W. Shepard.2The choice of Hanafiless well known-seems apposite because he has explicitly presented his project as
an antidote to the kind of scripturalism represented by Qutb, while harboring the
same aspirationas the latter to make Islam meaningful once again in the lives of the
Muslims.
Qutb and Hanafi have both stressed Islam's role in contemporary politics. Both
have urged action to bring about a better world. Hanafiexplicitly and Qutb implicitly
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address the turath-a word normally translatedas "heritage"but which refers to the
sum of contributionsto the life of the Muslims by the sacred texts, along with commentariesand interpretationsof these by theologians, jurists, and philosophers since
the revelation.3Yet Qutb and Hanafi differ in their approaches. The respected writer
Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri places Qutb in the bayan tradition, meaning Qur'anic
discourse that restricts itself to the use of sacred text and consensus for its message.
He views Hanafi, by contrast, as belonging to the burhan tradition. Here, only perception, experimentation,and rationalism generate knowledge of the world.4
Qutb and Hanafi both ran afoul of the Egyptian government. Qutb was hanged in
1966 by the regime for allegedly advocating its forcible overthrow. Hanafi was exiled briefly between 1979 and 1982. After earning his B.A. degree from Cairo University in 1956, Hanafi spent the next decade in France, getting a doctorate from the
Sorbonne in 1966. Clearly influenced by Western thought, he nonetheless sees it in
crisis because of its arrantsecularism. Qutb, too, was strongly influenced by Western
culture, especially its literature,in the 1920s and 1930s.5 However, he later recanted
all his pre-1948 writings and finds nothing redeeming in Western culture (although
he accepts its science and technology).
Basically a scripturalist,meaning that he believed that meanings are inherentin sacred texts, Qutb nevertheless occasionally adopted positions that suggested the need
for independent reasoning (ijtihad) and recourse to "secondary principles," such as
"public interest"(maslaha mursala),6a doctrine invented by jurists in later years to
provide guidance when the sacred texts themselves were silent. Mostly, though, Qutb
held that the sacred texts were self-evident, that they are a priori truths that simply
need to be invoked and implemented to solve the problems of the Muslims.
Hanafi is a left-wing phenomenologist and has served as chair of the Department
of Philosophy at Cairo University. He uses the sacred texts and the numerous commentators upon them in the spirit of radical reconstructionof religious thoughtratherlike MuhammadIqbal (d. 1938). A formermemberof the Muslim Brotherhood,
a connection he shares with Qutb, Hanafi remains sympathetic to the emotions expressed by its radical offshoots.
Qutb has had a significant impact on Arab culture and politics, especially among
the youth. Inter alia, his writings introduced to Arabs the thinking of the Pakistani
thinker Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), especially his stress upon "divine government" (usually wrongly translatedinto Arabic as hakimiyyatAllah),' and the inimical effects of an "anti-Islamic"(jahill) ethos in Islamic societies.
Hanafiis practicallythe only memberremainingof the "Islamic left" (a neologism
he coined), as many of his colleagues "sold out" to the Brotherhoodin the 1980s and
1990s. Hanafi'sbreak with the Brotherhoodprobably stemmed from his interest in
using philosophy and phenomenology to develop a radical critique of tradition in
ways that, to its members, probably smacked of sacrilegious tampering. Moreover,
Hanafi'swritings exude a sufi hermeneutic that naturally alienates most ulama and
the Brotherhood.His eclecticism-phenomenology, rationalism, social democracy,
critical theory, and sufism-partly accounts for the diffuseness of his writing.
Hanafi blamed Anwar Sadat for abandoning former Egyptian President Gamal
Abdel Nasser's policies. His enthusiastic support for the IranianRevolution, anathema to Sadat, led to his exile and a brief stint of teaching in Morocco and the Gulf
states in the early 1980s. Though he criticized the immaturityof Sadat'skillers, his
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supportfor their motives and feelings has alienated some intellectuals. He is primarily known for his massive, ongoing project, The Heritage and Renewal, the first installment of which is the five-volume work From Belief to Revolution. He has not
generated any popular base of support, and his impact remains confined to the academic level.
Apart from concern with Islamic tradition and membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hanafiand Qutb have in common careersin education-Qutb in primaryand
secondary education and in educational administration,and Hanafi in higher education. Both also studied in the West. Both have been bitterly critical of Western
imperialism, and the United States in particular.Qutb, however, was generally antiWestern, whereas Hanafi is a cosmopolitan and proud of his European ties. Both
have championed the Arab masses and counted on their ability to understandtheir
oppression and to act. Both have believed in the need to inculcate consciousness in
the masses by a tightly knit group of adepts, although they disagree on the means to
accomplish it. Hanafi adopts seemingly Leninist positions, whereas Qutb advocated
a more traditional response: emigration to form a pious nucleus of believers that
would grow through missionizing. Both have underpinnedargumentswith concepts
whose origins are Western.Hanafidoes this without apology, whereas in Qutb'scase,
the pattern is unacknowledged but discernible nevertheless.8
QUTB'S

DISCOURSE

In the late 1940s and early 1950s,9 Qutb was engrossed in the social problems of the
Arabs. A few short years later, however, he was to focus on more basic concerns.
This does not mean that he was in a secular phase which he then abandoned.10On
the contrary,in this earlier phase he believed that Egyptians (Arabs, Muslims) lived
in certifiably Muslim societies, and that those societies had problems that needed to
be addressed and solved. His works in this period abound with such terms as consultation (shura), social justice (al-'adala al-ijtimaciyya), mutual responsibility (altakaful al-ijtimc'i), and equality (al-musawat). Qutb ardently identified with the

poor and urged Arab regimes to improve their lives. This they could achieve, provided that they rejected Western and Soviet models for Islam and implemented Islamic ordinances." These writings unremittinglyreject Western cultural and social
ideas and practices, and they occasionally cite disillusioned Western writers, including George Bernard Shaw and Julian Huxley. Although he resided for a couple of
years in the West, Qutb did not command its languages and so relied on translations,
including those by the Indian Muslim Abu al-Hasan Nadvi.
By contrast,Qutb'slater writings are more "foundational."His concern was to warn
against living in a state of unwitting or willful ignorance of Allah's commands
(jahiliyya). It was a short step for his followers to pronounce unbelief (al-takfir)'2
upon people regardedto be behaving in such a manner.Qutb's vocabulary also included the Islamic method or system (al-manhaj al-Islami); organic, dynamic fusion (al-tajammu' al-haraki al-'udwl); the sovereignty of Allah (hdkimiyyat Allah);

godly existence (al-kaynuna al-rabbaniyya);worship of and servitude to Allah (alexertion for the sake of Islam (jihad). In these later writings (late 1950s
Cubuidiyya);
to mid-1960s) he reminds Muslims of their relationshipto Allah. Qutb has become
certain that most people claiming to be Muslims are not really Muslims. Despite his
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rejectionof non-Islamicmodels, Qutb in fact borrowedfrom Westernideas in seeking
to advancehis scripturalistpositions-especially in regardto mattersof social justice.
This is not to suggest that Muslims had not developed a concept of justice. Indeed,
justice (cadl) is a majorconcept in the Islamic heritage. However, classical texts and
commentariesrestrictedthe concept within a narrowcompass until the 1940s, when it
suddenly made its appearancein the form of social justice.
It is also ironic that, despite his repudiation of Islamic philosophy, Qutb's own
thought is suffused with organicism, one of the dominant attributesof that philosophy-which was stronglyinfluencedby Greekorganicnotions.'3His worksrepeatedly
refer to Islam as movement (haraka), vitality (hayawiyya), evolution (tatawwur), and

growth (namda').Attacking philosophers who seek secular knowledge, Qutb states:
"We seek the movement (al-haraka) behind knowledge."'4He writes of an Islamic
method (manhaj islaml) that is distinctive for its dynamism, rhythm, and touch. The
metaphorof growth (physis) that is so centralto Greek thoughtis also basic to Qutb's
view of Islam, whose outlook (tasawwur) posits harmoniousinteractionbetween nature and man. Islam, for Qutb, is a system that consists of an "organic and dynamic
fusion" (tajammuc haraki Cudwj).l5 This seemingly means an aggregation of commit-

ted Muslims who unite their ideas and actions to worship God. The whole (tajammuc)
is greaterthan the sum of its parts,just as a humanlife is greaterthan the sum of the
body's physical structure and its mental passageways. The following passage is
instructive:
Movement is one of the laws of this universe . . . and it is the same for the law of human

existence.... The humanbeing'sdesirefor movementto changeandevolve realityis a ...
fixedtruth.It stemsfromthe generalnatureof things,as embodiedin the movementof primal cosmic matter. . . and secondfromthe natureof this humanbeing.It is a requirement
of his dutyin the vice-gerancyon earth.... [Islamis basedon] freedomof naturalgrowth
in thoughtsandfeelings.... Life andexistencearenot stagnantbut alwaysmoving,always
changing,alwaysevolving,constantlybeingformed.'6
Qutb approvingly cites Leopold Weiss (MuhammadAsad), a recent convert to Islam, who wrote, "History tells us that all human cultures and civilizations are organic bodies resembling living creatures that pass through all the organic stages of
life."7 However, maintaining the eternity of Islam, Qutb quickly adds: "we could
never say that, like other civilizations, [Islam] is subject to the passage of time and
limited by the organic laws of life."'8
To summarize, then, Qutb reifies Islam, endowing it with beliefs and actions that
are aggregatedin an organic dynamic fusion. Islam grows and exhibits life processes.
Islam is, then, an independent,functioning entity (as opposed to a collectivity of individual Muslims who decide to act in the world). Though an actor, Islam is not subject to temporalprocesses, including entropy.Presumablyit retainsits vitality because
of the mechanisms of renewal that are somehow immanent in it. Among these presumably are renewal (tajdid), the application of discretion by a judge in Islamic law
(istihsan), and rulings based on public interest (maslaha mursala). That these mechanisms are actuated by actual people in actual historical times and places would
appearto underminehis reification, although this seems not to be an issue for Qutb.
Earlier, I maintainedthat Qutb is a scripturalistwho believed that classic texts are
fixed truths with fixed meanings. However, matters are not so simple. Qutb himself

The Dialectic in ContemporaryEgyptian Social Thought 381
makes a point of stressing that Islam is a realistic or practical religion. Two important words for him when qualifying Islam are waqi'i (actual, realistic) and Camali
(practical). For example, he maintainsthat "this religion is a serious, dynamic, practical system [manhaj Camaliharakijddd]."'9 He states that Islam "came to govern
life in its actuality [fi wdqiciha] and to face this actuality in order to make decisions
regardingit-whether to keep, modify, or fundamentallychange it."20Therefore, he
declares, "Islam legislates only for conditions that actually prevail."2'Islam "is not
a theory that deals with suppositions but is a system that deals with actuality."22In
order to make sure that he is understoodin the matterof the dynamism of Islam, he
declares:
Islamicsocietyis, thus,not a fixedhistoricalmodelas to its form,size, andthe kindof life
thatprevailsthere.... Islamiccivilizationcan takevariousformsin its concretestructural
manifestation,thoughthe principlesuponwhichit restsarefixed.... The formsof Islamic
civilizationthatrest uponthese fixed principlesare influencedby the degreeof economic
andscientificprogress,becausetheseformsmakeuse of whatin fact is foundin thatcivilization,whateverthe environment.23
What is Qutb getting at? Is he saying that the laws of Islam are eternal, but their
method of implementation changes according to different historical periods? His
emphasis on Islam as a practical religion seems to be suggesting so. He says that in
the Meccan period (610-22), the Muslims were urged to believe, but "they did not
have an actual independent life so that they could have organized themselves according to Allah's law."24However, in the Medinan period (622-61), the Muslims
were provided with the laws that they needed because, at this time, "they had an empowered state" and "laws were revealed to them, and the system was established for
them that met the actual needs of Muslim society."25
In distinguishing between the Meccan and Medinan periods, Qutb seems to imply
that changes in historical time bring with them changes in the way people address Islam. But at the end of the day, this is not in fact what he believes. He actually maintains his scripturalistidentity, because in the Meccan period, there were no laws to
obey, just beliefs to hold. Accordingly, the way to implement the laws could not have
changed across the two periods because it was only in the Medinan era that the
Prophet promulgatedactual laws.
Moreover, because Qutb'slate writings hold that everything that had happened after 661 (except for the rule of 'Umar II from 717 to 720) was jdhili,26 it is the Medinan era that stands as the unique exemplar for contemporary Egypt of Islamic
state and law. This means that one has no choice but to apply the fixed truths of the
Medinan model per se (there being no other models of true Islam) if one is interested in changing the Egyptian realities of the late 20th century (or any time period
after A.D. 661, for that matter).
Furthermore,note Qutb'sunit of analysis. It is "Islam"that "has come to regulate
the affairs of life in their actuality."27It is "Islam"that "faces this actuality in order
to make judgments about it with its commands."28Thus, if one is arguing that Qutb
insists on the historicity of the application of the law-according to which the
method of application may vary from one era to the next-one must somehow explain why Qutb is unwilling to accept the possibility that humanbeings might freely
wish to interpretmattersin non-scripturalistways. His reification of Islam rendersit
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difficult, if not impossible, to see the role of human beings except insofar as they
would today follow the model of Medina.
At one point, Qutb tries to show that the forms of Islamic society may differ while
the principles upon which they rest are immutable.29After Islam entered Africa, the
natives began to wear clothes and emerged from their "doltish lethargy" to engage
in energetic work. They stopped worshiping totems and prayed only to Allah. By
citing this example, Qutb feels he has demonstratedthe historicity of the forms of Islamic society in the context of the timelessness of Islamic values, presumablybecause
black African societies are structureddifferently, say, from Arabian societies on the
peninsula. But this is not persuasive. First, how can Qutb give this as an example of
Islamic society if it is inevitablyjahili? Also, in what way is his reference to central
Africa's embracing Islam a demonstrationof the historicity of the forms of Islamic
civilization? He has not shown the manner in which the legal, political, social and
economic processes and institutions of these Africans arose and vary from the legal,
political, social, and economic processes and institutions of anotherIslamic people,
while both peoples remain faithful to the eternal and unchanging principles. Qutb
does not demonstratehow individuals shaped these processes and institutions in historical time. Notice how he phrased it:
Islam[sic] createdcivilizationin centralAfricaamongthe nakedpeople,for by its veryexistenceit clothedbarebodies.Thus,the peopleenteredthe civilizationof clothing,embraced
by the Islamicorientationthatwas applied.Also, peoplebeganto abandontheirdoltishlethargy for energeticworkto exploitthe materialtreasures[of the world].Additionally,they
left the stateof tribalismfor the umma.Theystoppedworshippingspecifictotemsandbegan
worshippingAllah. Whatis civilizationif not this?. . . As for Islamenteringinto another
environment,it createsthroughits eternalvaluesanotherformof civilization,whichform
utilizesandfostersthatcivilization'sexistingassets andpossibilities.30
Once again, it is "Islam"that "creates"or "Islam"that "enters into." True, he speaks
of other forms of Islamic civilization, but it is Islam that creates these forms. If it is
"Islam"that does this, and if he already has told us that nothing is Islam except the
practice of the Prophet,the Medinan caliphate, and the rule of 'Umar II, then clearly
he leaves us with a dilemma: the Islam of 622-61 (and 717-20) must constantly replicate itself in all environments and all historical periods if the result is to be the
genuine article. If it does not, then the product is not Islam. Meanwhile, the role of
human beings has been reduced to the alleged actor who is acted upon-by a disembodied Islamic "system."3'
Recapitulating,in Qutb'sview the answers to the most pressing humanneeds over
the course of changing historical time are to be found within the web of Islamic
praxis (i.e., the unity of Islam's theory and practice). This is apparentlyso because
of the flexibility he believes is evinced by Islam, as manifested by what he holds to
be its dynamic quality, as outlined earlier. In short, internal to Islam are the socialresponse mechanisms to human needs. However, in truth, Qutb gives Muslims a
starkchoice between a reification (the model of 622-61/717-20) andjahiliyya. If all
other periods are ruled out as models for law and state, then it is hardto accept Qutb's
claim that while the general truthsof Islam are eternal, the method of implementing
the laws and regulations of Islam differ from one historical period to another.
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Whereas Qutb believed that he had logically anchored his concept of social justice
in the dynamic (haraki) quality of Islam, his views of social justice probably emanated from notions of distributivejustice of Western provenance. By this, I do not
suggest that Qutb directly drew from Western writings on social justice. I argue
ratherthat the social discourse of late-1940s Egypt, influenced by Fabian and other
Europeancurrentsof socialist thought, resonated with ideas of welfare, public good,
and collective responsibility-in a word, social justice.32 He thus appropriatedthe
concept of social justice from this discourse and "realized"(that is, materialized) it
in the sacred texts because of the importancehe attached to his project of showing
that Islam is superiorto any system generated in the West. Ironically, this act of appropriatingand "realizing"social justice in the Qur'an and sunna is furtherwarrant
for identifying Qutb as a scripturalist.
Distributive justice, with its roots in Plato and the Greeks, is embedded in the
concept of naturallaw. The law of natureapplies to a system of right or justice held
to be common to all human beings. Enlightenment writers argued that natural law
superseded the laws of religion and the state. Combining these considerations with
notions of social contract,philosophers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau held that
as individuals entered into such contracts, they did not cede their naturalrights to a
ruler but to society as a whole. Thus, society became the guarantorof the rights of
its members to freedom, equality, and social justice. In all this, there is no accommodation of divine law.
In the Qur'anic tradition,according to 4:58, "Allah commands you to returntrusts
to their owners." This is usually interpretedto mean that Allah has vouchsafed to
humanbeings, his vice-gerants, certain "deposits"or "trusts."These temporarilybestowed trusts (amdnat) include such things as knowledge and the law of God, which
must be returnedto Allah and the Prophet (their "owners"). By contrast, natural-law
and social-contract theorists held that it is society that is the trustee and human beings who, as the trustors,have vouchsafed their deposits (i.e., theirjustice, freedom,
equality, and pursuit of happiness) to this society. Consequently, it is society that
must render the trusts to their owners-that is, to individuals. This notion is, of
course, completely antithetical to the Qur'anic view, which holds Allah-not his
vice-gerants-to be the trustor.
Accordingly,

the Arabic term al-'adala

al-ijtimd'iyya-"social

justice"-is

a

20th-century neologism coined by Muslim writers taking cues from ideas imported
from abroad. Islamic scripture (the Qur'an and sunna) simply did not reflect within
its rich tradition such a thoroughly anthropocentricconcept as social justice.
In the Qur'an, the noun form 'adala-justice-does
not appear.Instead, the root,
in
the
and
verbal
'a-d-l, appears
perfect, imperfect,
imperative forms (Cadala/
and
in
the
form
As
it
noun
a
means
to proportion,create
verb,
('adl).
yacdilu/icdil),
in symmetry;to be just, equitable;to offer an equivalent; to swerve; to ascribe equals
[to God]. In the noun form, it means counterpoise, equivalent;justice; equity. Thus,
'adl in the meaning of "justice" and "equity"does appearin the scripturesbut lacks
a social dimension. In 2:282, the word qualifies a scribe writing down the terms of
a contract in a just manneror a guardianexplaining a contract in a just mannerto a
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mentally deficient individual. In 4:3, believers are admonished to act justly toward
orphanedgirls by marryingthe ones who are lawful to the Muslims in order to prevent their abuse. Later (4:129), Allah warns Muslims that they will not be able to
treat multiple wives equitably and hence should marry only one. Later yet (4:135),
Allah admonishes Muslims not to let lust make them swerve from justice.
At other points, Allah commands the Prophet to judge equitably among people
(al-nas) (4:58) or to arbitrateequitably among two warring factions (49:9). In 5:8,
Allah orders believers not to let hatredfor others cause them to deviate from justice
and warns them to be just. The term Cadlis also used to refer to "two persons of
equity" in regard to determining appropriatecompensation for killing game while
on the pilgrimage (5:95); witnessing the signature of a will (5:106); or witnessing
a man's divorcing his wife without violating the injunction not to do so during a
woman's pregnancy (65:2).
On some occasions, the justice in question refers to Allah's words, held to be perfect in truthandjustice (6:115) or deemed as enjoining justice (16:90). In 6:152, Allah commands people always to speak with justice. In 7:159, reference is made to
certain followers of Moses who "show the way to the truthand deal justly in accordance with it." More generically, in 7:181, Allah says that He has "created people
who lead [others] to truthand act justly in its light."And in 7:15, the Prophetis commanded to tell the faithful that he has been ordered to act with justice (or possibly
with "equivalence") toward them. In a final case, the word refers to the difference
between a dumb man and a man who is "just" and follows the right path (16:76).
Most of these references are to Allah's conduct; to discrete, individualized relationships among individuals involving quite specific aspects of private life, or to
very abstract notions of equity in people's general behavior. In the two cases in
which the arenain which justice is to be exercised seems to be a public one (4:58 and
49:9), the "social" dimension is still missing. In 4:58, the word nas (people) is an abstract term lacking notions of corporatepersonality and rights that inhere when one
speaks of social justice for a group in a modern sense. Instead, Allah commands that
those who judge must do so "in a just manner"(bi-l-adl) toward an abstractentity
referred to as "the people." In fact, Qutb's own commentary on this verse stresses
that the referent of al-nas in this passage is "each individual as an individual."33If
Qutb had social justice in mind, one would think that he would try to introduce the
concept of a citizenry ratherthan refer to atomistic "individuals as individuals."As
for 49:9-arbitrating with justice in relationship to warring factions-the justice
that is bespoken is akin to fair-mindedness.This is not the meaning of social justice
as it is understood in the modern sense, which is a matter of a collectivity whose
members share interests, constitute themselves as a corporategroup, and struggle to
promote those interests in the arena of civil society.34
In the sunna, the noun form 'adala appears only once in the eight major codices
of Sunni hadith.35This lone reference is in the phrase, "for these are people of steadfastness and justice" (wa hd'uld' ahl al-thabt wa-al-addla).36 The characterization,
"people of ... justice" qualifies a group of people who behave equitably in terms of
accepted understandingsof ethical behavior. It does not carry the connotations of a
corporate unit to which accrues the legal right and standing to demand justice as a
matter of the interest of the corporate whole.
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In a recent study, Toby E. Huff holds that in Islamic tradition, considerations of
justice are adumbratedby referenceto the "highly particularistic. .. treatingall cases
according to the particularitiesof the case and the individual . .. therebyrefrain[ing]
from establishing a set of uniform and universal principles of fairness and justice."
As Joseph Schacht puts it: "The aim of Islamic law is to provide concrete and material standards,not to imposeformal rules on the play of contending interests."37
The reason that it is importantto stress this point about the silence of the scripture
on the theme of social justice is that Qutb maintainsthat the Muslim can find everything necessary for his well-being there.38Although Qutb occasionally refers to the
fuqaha' of later generations to support some points that he wishes to make,39the
overwhelming majority of his references are to the Qur'anic and sunna texts.
It may be maintainedthatjustice takes on a social dimension in the writing of alGhazali (within the framework of his theory of virtue) and that, therefore, Qutb is
drawing from the Islamic tradition after all. However, as Mohamed Ahmed Sherif
notes, when al-Ghazali does talk about justice, his emphasis is on
justice in respectto charactertraits.It is truethathe speaksaboutthe religiouslaw andthe
needto observeit, butjustice for him is importantbecauseit is the virtueof the soul which
is a sign of individual perfection, not because it has a social function. Justice brings about

a harmonyamongthe facultiesof the soul, preparingthe individualfor superiorvirtues.Because of this view of justice, Ghazalidoes not list any virtuesunderjustice, unlike some
Muslimphilosophers,such as Miskawayh.This brief descriptionis all that Ghazalihas to
say aboutjustice.... He devotes more space to othervirtuesand thus he shows his disagreementwith the philosophictraditionin whichjustice, especiallyin its social context,
occupiesa high position.40
It is true thatjustice does, indeed, take on a social dimension in the writings of Islamic philosophy. Even al-Ghazali (who might be considered the least objectionable
of the philosophers from a Qutbian perspective) did accept in passing the Aristotelian Nichomachean Ethics' concept of distributive justice-rendering this as "justice in relation to transactions"and pointing out that "the distribution of goods in
the city can only be just when the ruler takes into consideration the functions of the
different classes of the city as well as the naturalorder of things."41But al-Ghazali
does not appearto have attemptedsystematically to integrate the Aristotelian notion
of distributivejustice into his scheme of the virtue and excellence of the individual,
and, indeed, it remained an ad hoc component of his Weltanschauung.Moreover, as
noted earlier, Qutb rejected the contributions of Islamic philosophy because, in his
view, they corruptthe intent of the scripture.
The rejoindermay be made that Islamic law permits invoking the doctrine of "secondary principles" when strict adherence to the "primaryprinciples" of the faith
might cause harmto the Muslims. Two such "secondaryprinciples"are discretion of
the jurist (istihsdn) and public interest (maslaha mursala).42 Consequently, those

sympathetic to Qutb's argumentcould hold that even if social-justice meanings are
absent in the original canonical sources, jurists writing in later historical periods
nonetheless have contributedto the gradualconstructionof precisely such a doctrine
of social justice by invoking these secondary principles in the desire to protect the
life's chances-hence, distributive social justice-of the Muslims. But in fact it
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seems that it is only in the 1940s that Muslim writers take up the matter of social
justice.
According to Olivier Carre,43the concept of social justice came into currency for
the first time in Sunni Islamic discourse in 1949 in the writings of MuhammadalGhazzali (who may have been the very first writer to use the term), CAbdal-Qadir
'Awda and Sayyid Qutb between 1949 and 1951.44Recently, it has been argued that
Qutbhad finished the draftof his book Social Justice and Islam in 1948, althoughactual publication did not follow for a year.45Qutb was to join the Brotherhoodshortly,
while the others were already members. (Significantly, 'Awdah had been trainedas a
lawyer in France.) If earlier jurists were adding to the corpus of legal thought that
could accommodate the idea that the naturalrepository for "social justice" was "Islam," it is surprisingthat the concept did not emerge earlier than the 1940s.
In summary,social justice is absent from the Qur'an and sunna. Although suspect
among the jurists who have been the architects of Islamic ordinances relating to social relations, certain Muslim philosophers did accept Aristotelian notions of distributivejustice in portrayingthe ideal individual and the ideal city. These writings
remainedon the margins of legal developments until the 20th century,when reformers, following the opening provided by Muhammad 'Abduh's (d. 1905) argument
that reason could constitute a basis for judgment in Islamic law, sought to work out
an Islamic concept of social justice. To do so, they addressed elements of social
democratic theory, with its roots in the Enlightenment,Locke, Hobbes, Roman law,
and the Greeks. The seeds of the concept of social justice are already to be found in
the writings of Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.
QUTB'S

TURN

FROM

SOCIAL

JUSTICE

Qutb turned from the social-justice themes in his later work, perhaps because the
Egyptian government-which had launched a devastating campaign against the
Muslim Brotherhood-had coopted the theme of social justice for its own ideology
of "democraticcooperative socialism." Increasingly, Qutb emphasized Allah's sovereignty (hakimiyyatAllah). As earlier noted, he was influenced in this by Mawdudi,
who, however, never used the term but instead spoke of "divine government."The
word hakimiyya does not appear in the Qur'an in this form. However, in two key
verses, judgment (hukm)is ascribed to Allah alone (12:40 and 12:67: "inna al-hukm
illa li-Allah"). Qutb'sinterpretationof these verses is that the word hukmshould be
translatednot as judgment but as rule.46Thus, when he interpretsthe crucial verses
in 5:44, 5:45, and 5:47, he renders the imperfect verbal form, yahkum, as rules, not
judges. These verses have traditionally been interpretedas follows: "He who does
not judge according to Allah's revelation is an unbeliever [5:44]/oppressor [5:45]/
ungodly [5:47]."
Hasan Hudhaybi, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhoodbetween 1951
and 1973, termed Qutb'sinterpretationof hukmand yahkumas sovereignty and rule
as a heretical innovation (bid'a),47 insisting that the traditionalrendering of "judging" and "judgment"was the correct one. Despite this, Qutb'sinterpretationhas introduced a new element into the discussion:
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Islamis servitudeto Allah alone and assigningdivinecharacteristicsto Him, the foremost
of which is sovereignty(al-hakimiyya).... "Andhe who does not rule accordingto what
Whatwe have saidaboutIslamis not a hereticalinnoAllahhas revealedis an unbeliever."
vationthatwe have thoughtup.48
Accordingly, Qutb adopted a radically uncompromising stand on these verses, on
the basis of which one might conclude that any Muslim who did not accept that sovereignty and rule were Allah's alone was an unbeliever. This in itself is not remarkable, but the idea that a particularindividual or group could claim the right to decide
whether or not others accepted Allah's sovereignty is rejected by many.49
These considerationsled Qutb finally to call for the establishmentof a countersociety of pious Muslims, which would be formed throughtheir figurative and, if necessary, literal "emigration"from the surroundinggodless (jdhili) society. Qutbwished
to create a sufficiently aware and committed core of adherentsto "true"Islam. He
hoped this would occur peacefully, but a coercive response by jahili rulers and their
supportersmight make this impossible.50

HASAN

HANAFI'S

PROJECT

As noted, Hasan Hanafi had also been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. His
studies at the Sorbonne, where he obtained the doctorate in 1966, exposed him to arguments of the left (socialism and Marxism), as well as to various scholarly approaches to knowledge, including phenomenology, rationalism, and critical theory.
Phenomenologists believe that knowledge comes from the apprehension of phenomena by direct investigation and through a formal description of their structure,
without recourse to theoretically based causal explanations. But causality is a
significant concern in the burhan tradition, a category into which Jabiri places
Hanafi, as was earlier indicated.
Hanafi intended his journal, The Islamic Left (al-Yasar al-lsldmi), to be a successor to the 19th-centuryal-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, founded by Muhammad 'Abduh and
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as a vehicle for the Islamic critique of Westerncivilization.
Sadat's September 1981 crackdown on domestic opposition groups meant that he
could publish only one issue of this journal.
Hanafibelieves that Qutb would have become a member of the "Islamic Left" had
he lived.5' He is sympatheticto much in Qutb'sperspective, both praising him52and
accepting many of Qutb'spremises, including, for example, the belief that Islam was
the first socialist religion.53HanafimaintainsthatQutb'sapparentextremism stemmed
directly from his torture.However, as Abu Zayd notes, this would not explain why
others such as Mawdudi, who had never suffered torture,adopted similar positions.
Hanafi, however, takes significantly different positions from Qutb, especially in regard to the importanceof philosophy and rationalism in human history and society.
Whereas Hanafi speaks of the "enlightened thinker"and "enlightened reason,"Qutb
insists on "servitude"(CubCudiyya)
and warns against the danger of secularism that
lurks insidiously in the interstices of rationalistdiscourse.54Hanaficould not disagree
more. In a forceful passage, Hanafi wonders:
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There is no doubt that if we wanted to get into a bidding competition in regard to belief and
defending Allah, razing [the edifice of] reason and cancelling out the humanbeing, we would
say that Allah rules over the mind and that the mind is the object that is governed; that Allah
is the creatorof it, the possessor of all things, the rulerof all things. But where can the danger
be? What is the situation in which we find ourselves? Is Allah in danger? Or is reason? Do
we defend Allah's hadkimiyyaor the hdkimiyyaof reason? Are we defenders of Allah or are
we humanbeings defending humanrights? It may be that the humanbeing, in the presence of
this bidding competition, will keep silent in fear of the coercion of the masses, the weight of
history, and the attack of the rulers. However, defending the rule of reason is the task of our
generation, defending the rights of the people [al-nds] and employing their minds.55
Hence, not surprisingly Hanafi disagrees with Qutb's implicit requirement that
"true" Muslims pronounce unbelief (takfir) upon "false" believers. One of Hanafi's
major goals is to transcend mutual recriminations in regard to pronouncing unbelief
and apostasy upon people.56 Hanafi's own purpose is the reconstruction of Islamic
civilization, a task he assigns to himself. In a remarkable comparison, his publisher
maintains that Hanafi's project is comparable to Ibn Khaldun's examination of the
rise and fall of civilizations for the purpose of regenerating Islam.57 One finds a certain instrumentalism in Hanafi insofar as his treatment of the turath is concerned.
Seemingly, he wants to fashion the turdth into an ideology. As such, this turdth becomes a repository from which to draw ideas and deploy them as weapons to stake
out interests in historical time and place.58
Hanafi wants to reconstitute the tradition of the ancestors (al-salaf) so that the
human being and history are placed at the center of concern. "The Science of the
Principles of Religion" (Ilm Usil al-Din), with which all classical Islamic learning
starts, ends, in Hanafi's scheme, with "The Human Being and History" (al-Insdn wa
al-Ta'rikh). It would appear that this bifurcation is based on ideal types, with the
former representing the experience of Muslims at the formative stage of their religion, and the latter reflecting the contemporary good Muslim liberated from the
negative accumulations of deadly imitation. Hanafi calls "The Science of the Principles of Religion" (Ilm Usil al-Din) "general history" (al-Ta9rikh al-CAmm); by
contrast, he calls "The Human Being and History" (al-Insdn wa al-Ta9rikh) "particular history" (al-TaDrikh al-Mutacayyan). Here is how he distinguishes between
general and particular history:
After general history, which is manifested in Prophecy and the Day of Judgment-that is,
in the past of human-kind and in its future-appears special or particularhistory, which is
manifested first of all in theory and action. . . Whereas general history was the creation of
Allah, since it is He Who sends the prophets and calls the people to Him on the Day of
Judgment, particular history is the creation of the human being. For theory and action are
individual, human categories; similarly, rule and state are discretionary human social systems. General history is materialized only in particularhistory. . . . [T]he Divine Project as
it was completed in the Revelation as Divine Knowledge can only be materialized through
the theory and practice of the human being and the rule and system of the community. It is
in particularhistory that the Science of the Principles of Religion is concluded, the Revelation of the Divine Will is achieved, beliefs are established, and order is perfected.59
Abu Zayd provides a chart (Table 1) purporting to show Hanafi's reconstruction of
Islam, one that features the juxtaposition of classical concepts with their anthropo-
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TABLE

1 Hanafi's reconstruction of Islam

The Human Being in History
(The Science of the Principles of Religion)

The Human Being
(Theology)

History
(Oral Traditions)

The Actual Human Being
(Justice)

The Ideal Human Being
(Monotheism)

I

l
Pure Consciousness
(Essence)

Actual Consciousness
(Attributes)

General History
(Prophecy, Day of Judgment)

Development of Revelation
(Prophecy)

The Future
(Day of Judgment)

Freedom
(The Creation Acts)

Reason
(Rebuke & Approbation)

Actual History
(Attributes, Ordinances, Imamate)

Theory & Practice
Attributes & Ordinances

Rule & Revolution
Imamate

Science of the Principles of Religion, cilm usul al-din; Theology, al-ilahiyyat; Oral Traditions, alsamciyydt; Monotheism, al-tawhid; Justice, al-'adl; Essence, al-dhdt; Attributes, al-sifat; The Creation
& Acts, al-khalq wa al-afcdl; Approbation & Rebuke, al-tahsin wa al-taqblh; Prophecy & Day of
Judgment, al-nubuwwa wa al-mi'dd; Ordinances & Imamate, al-ahkdm wa al-imdma.

centric and historicized counterparts.In the chart, the classical concepts are put in
parentheses, and their anthropocentric and historicized analogues are presented
above those concepts.60
In Hanafi'sview, the original subjects of 'llm Usul al-Din include oral traditions
(al-samciyyiit);the religious sciences (al-ildhiyydt);the oneness of God (tawhid); the
essence, attributes,and names of God (al-dhat. al-sifdt. al-asmd'); the contingency
of humanaction (iktisab);prophecy (nubuwwa);the day of judgment (mftidd);the ordinances of religion (ahkam);and the imamate(imama). Throughhumanreconstruction-that is, as a result of humanbeings living their lives in actual historical timethese classic concepts become transformedinto spatial and temporal qualities: the
ideal and the actual humanbeing, pure consciousness, particularconsciousness, freedom, reason, general history, particularhistory, theory, practice, rule, and revolution.
The reconstructedforms, of course, are producednot only throughhumanagency but
also by humanbeings who are fully conscious of what they are doing. Without this
transformationof the classical concepts of Islam, which can be effected only by
people actively mediating them through their concrete historical experiences and
struggles, Islam will remain simply an idealization that will never be actualized in
human communities.
Put in the context of Qutb's thought, this perspective is striking. Qutb wanted
somehow to make real for every late-20th-centuryMuslim Hanafi's"ideal type" of
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general history. In contrast, one might say that Hanafi's "unit of analysis" is the individual human being living in actual historical time. He would admonish that Qutb's
project, despite references to Islam as a practical religion, abstracts the human being
from the world in which he lives in the effort to make that individual the pious factotum of divine will.
Generally speaking, Hanafi is impatient with the failure of modern Islamic intellectual and social movements to unite their calls for action with a sound analysis and
theoretical foundation. It is no good to call for action to restore the excellence of Islamic society if one does not undertake a critique of Islam itself. Hanafi and Qutb
clearly part company on this important issue. Qutb assumes as given and unproblematical a number of the characteristics that Hanafi wants critically to analyze.
Here is how Hanafi puts it:
Modern [Islamic] reform movements have substituted action for theory, persisting in calling
for [action] for more than one and a half centuries.... Is it possible to call for action without a theory of action? Is it possible to change without a theory of change? . . . Thus, reform
[efforts] have remained [at the level of] mere preaching, giving guidance, goading the
people to action. But the people do not act on the basis of preaching but ratherby ... changing their conception of the world. Therefore a returnto the establishment of knowledge and
transforming unity into theory are the path to radical reform. The transition from reform to
revolution is first of all firmly rooted in the consciousness of the masses, which provides
them with a revolutionary conception of the world before the revolution occurs in fact. The
theory of knowledge is the necessary ideological edifice for the revolution of the masses.61
Hanafi maintains that early Muslims knew the importance of theory as the basis
of all action.62 These adepts worked through the complex of ideas that was raised before them by the Prophet-not in some abstracted manner, divorced from the historical conditions in which they lived, but, on the contrary, by reference to these
conditions. In this manner, early Muslims did not consider Allah as a mental construct
to be confirmed or disconfirmed. In a remarkable passage, Hanafi says that for them,
Allah is a project of humanity [mashri' al-insdniyya] the realization of which this humanity
has tried to effect from its inception until now. Allah is the progress of history in the creation
of which humanbeings have a share. Allah is not a subject whose existence can be rationally
proved but rather is history which progresses, reality which moves, and masses who make
revolution.63

Qutb would surely reject this assessment of Allah as somehow subsumed in human
history. He would hold that it is a classic case of jahill thinking, the more inimical
to the Muslims' interests because it is advanced by one whom he would regard as a
nominal believer.
But for Hanafi, any other interpretation is a prescription for continued stagnation.
Unfortunately, he maintains, this patent historicity of Islam and the role of the Muslims eventually became undone in favor of a perspective that abstracted the faith and
its believers from the world of reality into some hypostatization. How did things reach
this pass? Why is it that, as Hanafi sees it, Muslims are unable to understand their
situation in ways that will enable them to generate creative solutions to their present
problems? The short answer is the "tyranny" of Ash'arite ontology and epistemology,
which, despite its Mu'tazilite contenders, sealed its victory through the efforts of the
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greatAbu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 111 1).64 Ashcariauthoritariancontrol over the sharica
in the service of the ruling classes can be ended only by a constructive critique of the
entire "heritage."Otherwise, spontaneity by itself, as the left has long argued, can
achieve only so much.
For Hanafi, contemporaryArab society is divided into two parts, one represented
by the movement known as the salafiyya, the other by secularism. He sees his contribution to overcoming their sterile confrontation as freeing the salafis from their
rigid orientation toward the past (ittiba'), and as reforming the reprehensible innovations (bidca) of the secularists.65
Hanafi believes that the "heritage"is the basis of contemporaryawareness in society and calls it the "psychological storehouse" of the masses. In focusing on the
elements of the "heritage"that are in need of "renewal"(tajdid) Hanafi is motivated
by the needs of the present. For Hanafi, the "heritage" by itself has no inherent
value. Its worth is measuredby being the source for generating a scientific theory of
action that can be put to use for the individual's benefit. This seems somewhat like
secularism, but secularism interests itself in human progress without regard to religious knowledge and experience, a disregardthat Hanafi, of course, rejects. Here is
how he puts it:
Ourfaith [is] in the heritageand its renewal[al-turathwa al-tajdid]and the possibilityof
the heritage
solving the crisis of the [present]age . . . andthe possibilityof reconstructing
to give the [present]age a new pushforward.The heritage... is a psychologicalstorehouse
for the massesandthe theoreticalfoundationfor the structureof reality.66
Hanafi's purpose is to link contemporary values and concepts with those of the
heritage. But he does not really analyze the historical evolution and crystallization
of those values and concepts in the past or the present age. How have people come
to absorb particularvalues in their consciousness in historical time, past or present?
He accepts it as a given that certain values came to be held in earlier years. Seeing
similar values in the present age, he concludes that the latter emanate from the
former. He declares that his research "attempts to unite 'the heritage and the renewal"' and holds that "the historical roots of the crises of the [present] age [are] in
the old heritage, reading the past in the present and seeing the present in the past."67
Every era, he notes, shapes its culture and its conceptions. The conceptions of the
ancestors (al-salaf) were purely historical ones, expressing the realities of their time
and level of culture. The same process is at work in the contemporaryperiod. But
the two processes do not operate in mutual isolation. The relationshipbetween them
is a dialectical one of nonconnection and connection. Hanafi says that we necessarily start from our own time period and look back on our past. In doing that, we find
in our past the reasons for our currentproblems, for the decline and breakdownsthat
we are currently witnessing. "It is as though we choose from the old only what we
want."68

Thus, Hanafiseems to be proposing a ratherpragmaticcourse: select from the heritage those elements that seem to make sense and are also relevant for currentproblems. If we do this, then we can avoid trying to achieve the impossible, returningto
a golden age in wholesale fashion. What is to ensure that Hanafi'sprocess of selection
does not become unmanageable?He presumably would maintain that one would be
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guided by the categories of 'Ilm Usul al-Din, and not by phenomena divorced from
that theological foundation.Those categories, as noted earlier,include oral traditions;
the religious sciences; the oneness of Allah; the essence, attributes,and names of Allah; the religious ordinances; the contingency of human action; prophecy; day of
judgment; and the imamate. But that still leaves the scope for choice rather wide.
Contemporaryproblems in Islamic societies include illiteracy, hunger,poverty, overcrowding, maldistributionof wealth, and authoritarianrule. What aspects of kalam
can one draw upon to confrontand begin to solve some of these problems?Moreover,
who is to do the selecting?
Yet the process is not totally ungoverned, Hanafi maintains. In his view, the
movement from the present to the past, which he characterizes as an "ascending
movement," is mediated by what he calls the "psychological storehouse" of the
masses. By this, he seems to mean that the ordinaryMuslim has a certain stock of
appreciationand understandingof the heritage as he or she looks back on the past
for guidelines for currentbehavior. On the other side of this is the movement from
the past to the present, which he characterizes as a "descending movement," and it
is mediated by what he terms "consciousness" (shu'ur).
To summarize this, then, as the Muslim moves back in time, he or she draws on
his or her "psychological storehouse"of values and symbols, based on his or her understandingof that heritage. Then, armed with the appropriateelements of the old
kalam, he or she moves forwardin time toward the present again. This time, though,
instead of drawing upon his or her psychological storehouse, he or she applies his or
her perceptions and awareness of current-dayproblems in terms of the model solutions that the elements of the heritage with which he or she is armed can provide. It
is this supposedly dynamic process-seeing the relevance of the past for the present
and projecting the problems of the present into the past-that will allow Muslims
finally to address and solve their most pressing concerns.
Hanafi boldly asserts that the tragedy of the Muslims lies in a mechanical following of the models of the past. His solution is the "Islamic left," whose discourse, he
believes, derives from human reality and history, not some disembodied, abstracted
sacrality(qaddsa) existing outside of history.According to Hanafi'sline of argument,
the heritage is not a cluster of fixed theoretical truths. Truthsbecome such only in
specific times and places. The "heritage"is thus the sum of the validations (tahaqquqdt) of these theoretical truths in specific historical times and places, validations
effected by the behavior of individuals. This being so, then the old truthsare always
subject to reevaluation at later historical times and places. Here, he feels, is Islam's
mechanism for genuine change and renewal. Too many people say "Let us returnto
the past." Hanafi avers, "Let us use the past to understandthe present but abandon
those aspects of the past that are not relevant, replacing them with truthswhose foundations may be in the past but which otherwise are put in the service of present
needs."
If Qutb says "let us returnto the pristine Islam,"Hanafi'srejoinderis "the renewal
of Islam is the solution." Hanafi criticizes scripturalistswho believe that the truthis
in the texts. He maintains that meanings are not inherent in texts but are attributed
to them by actual human beings.69Yet human beings can renew Islam only in con-
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crete interaction with their own historical time, and Hanafi would appearto need to
show how this interaction takes place and with what results.
For example, suppose Hanafi tells us that more democracy, as embodied in the
concept of "consultation" (shurd), is needed in the present to solve some of the
problems of society. He tells us this because, in his opinion, in the early years of Islam one could find the roots of democracy in the shiurdidea. Yet he avoids showing
how the roots of democracy actually were developed in those early years through a
close historical analysis of groups, movements, and ideas. Did shiiur indeed evolve
from a struggle of people in specific circumstances, or is shurd something that is
counseled by Allah and the Prophetfor the purpose of a fuller understandingof Allah's laws? If the latter, then it does not have much to do with democracy. If the
former, then it is necessary for Hanafito provide the specifics of the historical struggles that led to the understandingof shuirdin more than a purely divine, revelational
context. One cannot simply look at texts (the Qur'an and sunna) in that early period
from a contemporaryperspective and find "democracy"in the texts. For that is tantamount to abandoning the historicity of texts.
Similarly, it could be that the value of equity-for example-pertained to ethical
injunctions to be upright in relations with Allah, one's family members, and neighbors by not dissimulating to them. According to this view, too much wealth in the
hands of one person could greatly complicate one's chances of being upright in relations with one's God, family members, and close neighbors. Yet stated as such,
this has nothing to do with equity at the community level. What Hanafi wants to do
is discover in the heritage the value of equity and use it to solve the problem of pervasive poverty in Egypt today. But to do this, he would have to show that the value
of equity was used in this way by the early Muslims. To do that, in turn, Hanafi
needs to show us how people in the early period struggled with one anotherat given
historical junctures to vindicate the idea that equity in the early period conveyed the
sense of obligations by putative citizens of the community to arrogateto that community as a social unit the authorityand legitimacy to redistributewealth in defense
of its interests as a corporate whole against contending and competing interests.
Hanafi cannot simply assume that this orientation to equity inhered in early times
and so can be culled from the past and applied in the currentperiod.
To be sure, Hanafi says that his method avoids these problems and takes into account that those early texts came to be written in historical time and place. This implies that comprehending them requires an understandingof the forces that went
into their production. However, he does not seem to provide a historically grounded
analysis of this sort. What is missing is an explanation of people's behavior and
ideas in concrete historical junctures and in interaction with social, economic, and
political groups, movements, and institutions. Hence, he may ironically be said to
have committed the same errorof ahistoricity of which he accuses the scripturalists.
Hanafi'sdialectic of change is abstractand diffuse. The same is not true of his outline of action on behalf of that change. It is true that he has a ratherutopianobjective
for the "Islamic Left"-to awaken the Muslims and achieve a revolution through a
scholarly critique of the heritage.70But when contemplating the actual implementation of a revolution, he raises aloft the familiar bannerof the left. Borrowing a page
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from Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, he writes that Islamic reformers have basically
tried merely to understandthe world, whereas it is now importantto change it.7' However, in orderto effect such a change, one cannot rely only on ideas. Ultimately adopting a Leninist position, he declares that it is importantto establish a revolutionary
partyorganizationfor mass mobilization. Once a leadership is established for this organization, it will engage in raising the consciousness of the people. This eventually
will be followed by armed struggle for full liberation from colonialism, feudalism,
and other evils. Again in ratherutopian manner, he insists that the party will truly
representthe masses, not a particularclass or group. In colorful terminology, Hanafi
maintains that this party is the "caliph of Allah's chosen people."72
Qutb'sview of the dynamic of the revolution is somewhat similar. He, too, speaks
of a revolutionary "leadership"(qiyada),73which has distinct leftist connotations.
However, Qutb stops short of advocating a political party, contenting himself with
the notion of emigration and establishing a countersociety on the periphery of existing jdhili society. Once sufficient numbers have come over, the process of total
transformationto Islamic society will occur, peacefully if the state does not react
with coercion-although Qutb was virtually certain that the state would use forceotherwise through violence.
CONCLUSIONS

Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi represent two important currents of contemporary
social thought in Egypt. Many of their concerns are similar, including a profoundattachment to and concern with the turath of Egyptians, Arabs, and Muslims. While
Qutb may be termed essentially a scripturalist,believing that sacred texts convey inherent meanings in an ahistorical fashion, Hanafimaintainsthat the meaning of texts
depends on their interpretersand hence on the consensus of each generation.
Qutb rejected rationalism and philosophy more generally because, in his view, it
departed from the religious attitude and from religious commitment. Hanafi championed the application of reason as the only way for Muslims today to come to grips
with their most pressing problems. Qutb reified Islam and attributedto it qualities of
vitalism, growth, and power. Hanafi sees things differently, believing it more constructive to take not "Islam" as his unit of analysis but Muslims living in concrete
historical periods.
Yet Hanafi's method of seeing the past in the present and projecting from the
present into the past seems to short-circuit historically grounded analysis after all.
He concludes that Muslims can choose from their heritage what suits them in solving the problems of today. But it is not clear that in doing so they indeed will be
choosing aspects of the heritage that resonate with the actual requirementsof Muslims living in the modern period, because he does not really provide us with an
analysis of how values of the past came to acquire specific meanings, in actual historical time and place, for the people of that time. Let us recall that Hanafi'swhole
project rests on demonstratingthe relevance of historical context for the significance
of values. If he does not demonstratethis for the past, whence these values derive,
how can he be confident about their applicability for modern historical contexts?
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Qutb'sdiscourse does not permit the selective choosing from aspects of a putative
heritage. He would insist that Islam must be taken or rejected in its entirety.For him,
of course, there can be no choice between these two alternatives. The very idea of
social engineering of the sort implied in Hanafi'sscheme is anathema to Qutb. Yet
Qutb is just as affirmativeand positive in his outlook as Hanafi is that Muslims have
the model solutions to their problems near at hand. Both view the future with optimism. It is just that Qutb believed that Islam, which he reified, is indivisible.
Qutb, at least in the early 1950s, emphasized themes of social justice. That he was
borrowing a concept that emerged in a Western context is clear enough, but he
would of course deny that and stress that social justice is rooted in the enormously
rich legacy of Muslim writings on the concept of Cadl.There is nothing wrong with
making social justice one of the pillars of one's analysis. But Qutb's insistence that
the concept inheres full-blown in Islamic scriptureis not tenable. Moreover, analysis of this issue shows that discourses as apparentlydifferent as those of Muslims
and non-Muslims penetrate one another in subtle and important ways.74

For Hanafi, it is important,in vindicating "Islamic"ends, to borrow as much from
the heritage of the past as is suitable but then to supplement this with concepts and
ideas from outside that heritage. Hanafi feels no constraints about analyzing his society through philosophical lenses that are shaped by the major intellectual movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, beyond the boundaries of the umma.
As for practical results, both take a revolutionary position. For Qutb, the model
solutions to the problems confronting the Muslims today revolve arounda rejection
of the society in which they find themselves, a figurative and even literal migration
from such a society, and the construction of the bases for a countersociety of piety
and social action. For his part, Hanafi believes that his radical and recondite reconstruction of the heritage will be understood by the masses, and when that happens,
they will be ready for mobilization. Bringing this to pass, however, will require a
nucleus of dedicated leaders, whose task will be to inculcate the appropriatetheoretical perspective and then lead the masses into action. Although both projects
strike one as utopian, it may be prematureto voice such a verdict, particularly-as
both writers so frequently have declared-in light of the failure of liberal, corporatist, socialist, and Marxist models over the last century.
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4Jabiri, Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabt, vol. I: Takwtin al-'Aql al-cArabi (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda

al-'Arabiyya, 1991), 103; and ibid., vol. II: Binyat al-'Aql al-'Arabi (1990), 383-84.
sHaddad says that Qutb's fascination with literature and interest in Western culture was shaped by
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Islam, new ed., vol. VI, fascicules 109-10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 738-40, s.v. "Maslaha."On maslaha
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fi al-Isldm, 9th ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1983), 119 ff.
7Itappearsthat Mawdudinever wrote in Arabic, so his Arabic-languagetranslatorstook some liberties.
(lit. divine government)has been inaccuratelytranslatedas hdkimiyyat
Thus, his phrase,hukuimat-iildhivvyya
Allah (divine sovereignty). These are not identical terms. Thanks to Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr for confirming
my view in this matter.
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Certainly,Qutb'sMa'acdlim
Egyptian Muhammad'Amarawrongly attributesto Mawdudithe phraseal-hdkimiyyaal-ildhiyya. See, for
example, his article "Takfiral-Muslim," in al-'Arabi (Kuwait), no. 335 (October 1986), 16-20. And on
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caliphate of 'Umar ibn CAbd al-'Aziz (717-20);

'Amara, al-Sahota al-Isldmiyya wa al-Tahaddi al-IHaddri

(Cairo: Dar al-Shurufq,1989), 149, 152-53.
8See ShahroughAkhavi, "Sayyid Qutb:The Povertyof Philosophy and the Vindication of Islamic Tradition," in Cultural Transitionsin the Middle East, ed. Serif Mardin(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 130-52.
9Hasan Hanafi believes that Qutb's writings can be divided into four periods: (1) literary writings
(1930-50); (2) social writings (1951-53); (3) philosophical writings (1954-62); (4) political writings
(1963-65). See his "Athar al-Imam al-Shahid Sayyid Qutb 'ala al-Harakatal-Diniyya al-Mu'asira," in
al-Din wa al-Thawrafi

Misr, vol. V: al-Harakdt al-Dtniyya al Mu'adsira (Cairo: Maktaba Madbuli, 1988),

167-300. For a somewhat different periodization of Qutb's life from that of Hanafi, see Haddad, Contemporary Islam; and for yet a third periodization, see Diyab, Sayyid Qutb.
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mid-1950s and lasted until the end of his life.
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MaktabatLajnat al-Shabab al-Muslim, 1953).
I21tis true that the concept of takfir and its verb form, kaffara, is implicit in Qutb's writings. He seldom seems to have used the words directly, though it seems a logical step for his followers to do so-
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Rightly Guided Caliphs and the rule of 'Umar ibn CAbdal-CAziz(717-20) as jdhili and mushrik.
131am not suggesting that Qutb'sorganicism comes from his readingof Greek philosophers, merely that
despite his repudiationof Greekphilosophy,he cleaves closely to an aspect of Greekthoughtthathad a profound influence on Muslim philosophy. Probably,Qutb'sown organicism can be traced partly to Muhammad Asad, a convert to Islam whose original name was Leopold Weiss. This can be seen from the citation
from Weiss that appearsearlier. In fact, according to Haddad,Asad was a crucial influence on Qutb in the
1950s. See Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb,"70. For caution regarding the importance of external influences on
Qutb, see IbrahimM. Abu-Rabi', Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 139.
14Qutb,Khasdaisal-Tasawwural-lslami wa Muqawwimatuhu(Cairo:Dar Ihyadal-Kutubal-'Arabiyya,
1962), 52-53.
15Qutb,Ma'alimfi al-Tariq, 2nd ed. (Cairo[?]: Maktaba al-Wahba[?] 1964[?]), 37.
6Qutb, Khasa'is, 46, 84-85, 100.
17Ibid., 102.
"Ibid., 103.
19Qutb,Ma'alimfi al-Tariq, 32.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23Ibid., 118-19.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Qutb'sattributionof jahiliyya to Islamic societies was not limited to those of the 19th and 20th centuries. In fact, he declares:"The existence of the Islamic ummais consideredto have been ended many centuries ago"; Qutb, Ma'dlimfi al-Tarlq, 5. 'Amara, commenting on this passage, puts it this way: "Sayyid
Qutb went beyond Mawdudi in pronouncingsociety to be jdhili and pronouncingkufr upon it. He stated
what Mawdudihad not, passing the judgmentof kufrupon the umma,and not upon the society and the state.
He expressed this judgment with certainty,and he indeed pronouncedthe judgment of this umma'sbeing
in a state of kufr over the centuries";'Amara, al-Sahwa, 153.
27Ibid., 32.
2tIbid.
29He puts it this way: "[Islamic values] were not the creation of history and have no intrinsic relation
to time. They are a reality that came to humankindfrom Allah, transcending human reality and material
existence"; ibid., 118-19.
30Ibid., 119-20.
31A disjuncture exists between Qutb's insistence on fixed truths and his advocacy that Muslims put
at the service of their society the gains in material civilization that have taken place in jdhili society. It
is certain that Qutb does not wish to turn back the technological clock. But it is not clear how technological innovations can be made to conform with the fixed truthsof the 7th century. It should be remembered that Qutb includes as part of such fixed truthsthat belong in the realm of Allah's guidance "human
affairs, values and standards, principles and fundamentals in the political, social or economic systems
and interpretationof the causes of human activity or the dynamics of human history"; Qutb, Mac'dlim
fi al-Tariq, 124. For these matters, Qutb categorically forbids turning to jahili society. Yet, one cannot
simply apply advances in engineering and the physical sciences without regardto these elements, which
entail complex considerations of public policy and property rights (including patents) for which 7thcentury truths not only would not provide guidance but could present obstacles.
32MustafaSiba'i, then chairman of the departmentof fiqh at the University of Damascus, wrote in
1959 that at a gathering where people were debating whether Syria could benefit from socialism, he expressed his opinion about the socialism of Islam and was rebuked by one who said: "Before word about
socialism spread in Europe, none of us heard anyone call for socialism in our country. But now everyone
calls for it, so that Islam has become socialist." Sibai replied: "After we came into contact with Western
civilization and began to move towards reformingour political and social affairs, it was inevitable that we
would be influenced by currentsof thought prevailing in the West. What's so strange about our utilizing
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from the West sound methods in imitation of its influence upon our currentrevival." See Sibaci, Ishtirakiyyat al-Isldm (1959), 2nd ed. (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmi ii al-TibC'awa al-Nashr, 1961), 8.
33Qutb,Fi al-Zilal al-Qur'dcn,12th ed. (Jidda:Dar al-CIlmIi al-Tiba'awa al-Nashr, 1986), 11:689.Qutb
emphasizes that it is not just Muslims or the People of the Book but all humanbeings who are covered by
this command. Moreover, he insists that the phrase "judgejustly among the people," is a "right"(haqq) to
which these same people are entitled. He adds that the "justliness"(Cadl)that must characterizethe judge's
judgment toward the people is a "comprehensive"justliness (Cadlshamil). In this regard,I take him to be
trying to broadenthe concept so that it approximatesmore our modern concept of social justice.
34This is not to say that later on jurists did not devise mechanisms that might be considered creating
the preliminary groundworkfor the construction of an understandingof "social justice" in Islamic history. The main one that needs to be mentioned is the concept of maslaha mursala-or the public interest.
If one can adduce the idea that a public interest inheres, then one can proceed to maintain that one element of the public interest is the achievement of social justice.
35Thesecodices are those of al-Bukhari, Muslim, Da'ud, al-Tirmidhi,Malik, al-Shafi'i, al-Nasa'i, and
Ibn Hanbal.
36Abu CAbdal-Rahman al-Nasa'i, Kitdb al-Ssunan,"Ashribah,"48, as cited by A. J. Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la TraditionMusulmane (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), III-IV:155.
37TobyE. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 216; Joseph Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 203, cited in Huff, p. 217. Emphasis added.
38Islamists such as Qutb generally cite part of 6:38 as a warrantfor this view that the Qur'an anticipated developments that occurred in later historical time: "We have left out nothing from the Book."
39For example, he uncritically accepts Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's (d. 1350) reflections on relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the context of a discussion on jihad, and Ibn Qayyim's writings
on hadd punishments-for instance, in regardto theft. Despite Qutb'sharsh attitudes on the "distortions"
that were allegedly wreaked upon Islam after the Rightly Guided Caliphs (i.e., after A.D. 661), he actually
equates ibn Qayyim's reflections on jihad and the hadd punishments for theft with "Islam."See Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini (Cairo: Sina' li al-Nashr, 1992), 42-43.
40MohamedAhmed Sherif, Ghazali's Theory of Virtue (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1975), 73.
41Ibid., 72.
421It
is also worth pointing out that Qutb was very cautious in regardto the role of maslaha mursala in
Islamic law. Thus, he accepted the teachings of the Maliki school in this regard,ratherthan the more permissive Shafi'i teachings. This is because in the Maliki interpretation,ijtihad, or independentjudgment to
deduce a ruling of law, is circumscribedby rathersalient restrictions,whereas the Shafi'i school is more
open and tolerantof the usage of ijtihad and even-in its form as al-ijtihad al-tawfi accords precedence
to it over the text. This bespeaks Qutb'sreluctanceto invoke the "secondaryprinciples"for fear of violating
the categorical imperativeof the sanctity of the text (nass). See AbuiZayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dint, 67. In
a way, Qutb'scaution on ijtihad in relationshipto occasions for which textual stipulation appears to exist
seems to be contraryto his notion-already mentioned of Islam's"dynamicmethod"(manhajharaki)and
In a relatively rare application of the idea of Islam as emits "dynamic realism" (waqi'iyya harakivvyya).
bodying a dynamic element, he maintainsin perhapshis most famous work, Milestones (1964), that people
must not regardeach Islamic text as final. This comes in the context of his effort to refute those who claim
that Islam'sconception of jihad is purely defensive. Those who maintainthat it is only a defensive idea do
not understandthe natureof the stages throughwhich this "dynamic system" has passed. See Ma'alimfi
al-Tarlq,56-57. But it turnsout that virtuallythroughouthis work, Qutb is willing to consider the changing
natureof Islamicprescriptionsonly within the confines of the doctrineof "abrogationof one text by another"
(al-ndsikh wa al-mansuikh).One is therefore tempted to say that Qutb'sattributionof a dynamic element
to Islam occurs only when it suits his argument.
43Olivier Carre and Gerard Michaud, Les Freres musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (Paris: Editions Gallimard/Juillard,1983), 84, 233.
44Apartfrom Qutb's own book, al-'Adala, one should cite al-Ghazzali's book, al-Isldm wa-Manahij
al-Ishtirakiyya (Cairo, 1949); and 'Awda's al-Mal wa al-Hukmfi al-Isldm (Cairo/Beirut, 1951). According to Hasan Hanafi, prior to publishing his book on the subject, Sayyid Qutb had written an article in
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1949 on the matter, although this is not cited in the extended bibliography of Qutb's works attached to
the end of Diyab's Sayyid Qutb.
45'AdnanMusallam, "Sayyid Qutb and Social Justice,"Journal of Islamic Studies 4, 1 (January 1993):
52-70. Qutb himself used the term "social justice" in the title of an article that he published in Majallat
al-Shu'un al-Ijtimd'iyya in 1944, although this was during his secular phase. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for this last piece of information.
46Thatthis is clearly a departuremay be seen by the fact that in the Qur'an, the root associated with
notions of rule is a-m-r, not h-k-m. He remains a scripturalist,however, despite this innovation, because
he simply would say that the meaning of the text is self-evident.
47See Hudhaybi's book Ducat, la Qudat (Cairo, 1977), esp. 63, 72-73. Saying he has not found the
term hdkimiyyain either the Qur'an or the sunna, Hudhaybi stresses that he has no trouble with the idea
that to Allah accrues all power in the universe-all Muslims must avow this. But he objects to the idea
of Qutb and his followers that this principle of Allah's absolute power means that human beings cannot
make any laws for the regulation of society. What is unacceptableis that a self-appointed group can apply
a litmus test to others as to whether their behavior enhances or detracts from Allah's omnipotence. "This
view of hakimiyyais erroneous."Allah has given humanbeings the ability to write and implement laws:
"Truly, Almighty Allah has left us enormous leeway in the affairs of the world."
48Qutb,al-CAdalaal-lIjtima'iyya, 9th ed., 12.
49The standardresponse by the official clergy and liberal Islamists is that as long as an individual has
recited the credo of the faith, the authenticity of his or her belief is a matterfor Allah to decide. Several
hadlths are frequently cited, including one in which the Prophet is related to have said: "I was not commanded [by Allah] to penetrate into the hearts of the Muslims." Mawdudi himself insisted on extreme
caution in this area. See 'Amara, "Takfiral-Muslim," 18.
50Fordiscussion of these points, see Qutb, Ma'ilimfi al-Tariq.
51"If [Qutb's]evolution had continued in its naturalcourse, he would have ended with scientific socialism to correspondwith Islam, and he would have become one of the pillars of the Islamic left in Egypt and
one of its primarysupportsin the Islamic world."See Hanafi, "Atharal-Imam,"219.
52Ibid., 167-300.
53Hanafi,"al-Tadamunwa al-Wahda,"in Hanafi, al-Din wa al-Thawrafi Misr, 1952-1981, vol. IV:
Al-Din wa al-Tanmiya al-Qawmiyya (Cairo: Maktaba Madbuli, n.d.), 110, 116 ff.
54ForQutb's contempt for "mere abstract knowledge that traffics with minds," "mental logic," "locking up truth inside explanations," and so forth, see his Khasd'is, 8, 16, 19-20.
55Hanafi, Min al-cAqida ili al-Thawra, vol. III: al-'Adl (Cairo: MaktabaMadbuli, 1988), 438. Compare this citation to the following one from Qutb:
What is the foundation to which human life reverts and upon which it rests? Is it Allah's religion and its
system of life or is it human reality of whatever sort? Islam decisively and unhesitatingly answers this
question. The foundation to which the sum and essence of human life must revert is Allah's religion
and its systcm of lifc.
See Ma'Cilimfl al-Tariq, 92. Qutb then immediately poses the following interrogatory:"Islam poses the
question: are you more knowledgable, or is Allah?" Qutb says that Islam replies: "Allah knows, and you
do not know. You have been given only a little knowledge." And he goes on:
He who teaches, creates, and nourishes is the One Who rules. His religion must be the system of life,
it is the foundation to which life reverts. As for human reality, theories, and religions, they are corrupt
and deviations, resting on the knowledge of human beings, who do not know and to whom only a little
knowledge has been given. Allah's religion is not obscure, nor is His system of life vague. It is determined by reference to the second part of the credo: "And Muhammad is His Prophet."It is contingent
upon what the Prophet preached about the fundamental texts. If a text exists [about a matter], then the
text rules. There can be no ijtihdadwhen it comes to a text. The role of ijtihad comes into play when
there is no text, according to the principles established in Allah's system itself, not according to caprices or wishes. "If you dispute in a matter, refer it to Allah and His Prophet" (4:59). The principles
established for ijtihad and istinbat [deductive discovery] are also known and not obscure or vague. No
one can say about a law [shar'] that has been enacted: "This is Allah's law," unless he has proclaimed
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that sovereignty is Allah's, not the people's, nor a party's, nor any human being's; and unless he reverts
to the Qur'an and the Sunnah to know what Allah wants. No one who wants to do so can claim authority in the name of God, which is what Europe experienced in the form of theocracy. There is nothing of
this in Islam. No one can speak in Allah's name except His Prophet. There are specific texts, and they
are what determine what Allah has legislated. The statement that religion is for the sake of reality is
misunderstood and misapplied. Yes, this religion is for the sake of reality, but which reality? The reality that this religion itself establishes, according to its system, which simultaneously is in consonance
with human nature, and meeting true human needs in their entirety. These are needs which the Creator
has established, and He knows what He has created. . .. Religion does not face reality-of whatever
kind-in order that it be established and studied by reference to one of its documents and by reference
to a legal ruling that relates to it, like a tabula rasa. It faces reality in order to weigh it on its scales,
and it establishes what it establishes and discards what it discards. It creates another reality if it is not
satisfied with it. The reality that it creates is reality. This is the meaning of the phrase, "Islam is a religion for reality,"or what it should mean in its true sense. Perhaps the question may be asked: "Is it not
the interest of human beings that forms their reality?" Again, we go back to the question that Islam
poses and answers: "Are you more knowledgeable, or is Allah?" "Allah knows, and you do not know."
The interest of human beings is contained in Allah's law, as revealed by Allah and propagated by the
Prophet [ibid., 93-95].
Repeatedly, Qutb reifies Islam. Even when he speaks about ijtihad and istinbat, he seems to be imputing
historicity to humanbehavior in a passing and glancing way. "This religion does" or "Islam says" are the
operative kinds of expressions in his discourse.
56H-anafi,Mmin
al-'Aqida ild al-Thawra, vol. I: Al-Muqaddimdtal-Nazariyya (Cairo: MaktabaMadbuili,
1988), 39.
57See ibid., back cover.
58Boullata is wholly persuasive when he says that for Hanafi the turdth consists of "specific realizations of certain beliefs and attitudes under particularhistorical circumstances"; Issa J. Boullata, Trends
and Issues in ContemporaryArab Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 40.
59Hanafi, Min al-'Aqida ild al-Thawra, vol. V: al-Iman wa al-'Amal-al-Imdma (Cairo: Maktaba
Madbuili,1988), 5.
60Abu Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini, 155.
6-Hanafi, Min al-'Aqlda ild al-Thawra, vol. I, 243. On the preceding page, he maintains that:
In modern reformist movements [presumably the Salafiyya] attempts to reconstruct the theory of
knowledge or to formulate the theoretical introduction to the science of usul al-din have not taken
place as they did in the past. Instead, the theory of knowledge remained hidden, its place being taken
by the description of the historical development of knowledge in order to know what is authentic and
what is extraneous to it. The goal of defining the course of knowledge in history is to know how the
transition occurs from unity to diffusion, from community to separatedness. so that we can transcend
the current condition of diffusion and segmentation to the original condition of unity and community.
As a consequence [of this transcendence] the science of usiulal-din will revert to being a guide for the
conduct of the people toward action.
62Ithas been suggested that Qutbemphasized the importanceof theory as the indispensableprerequisite
of practice.This is reflected in his use of the word "conception"[tasawwur].While it is true that Qutb was
interestedin theory,it is in a way that is differentfrom Hanafi.Hanafi'stheory is a critical theory, according
to which subject matteris held to be problematicaluntil demonstratedto the contrary.Qutb'stheory is essentially an uncritical "Islamic conception" that becomes the template for humanaction. Action is Qutb's
watchword,though the agent that acts is "Islam."
63Hanafi, Min al-'Aqldah ild al-Thawra, vol. I, 89.
64RichardKhuri,"A Critiqueof Hassan HanafiConcerningHis Reflections on the Scarcity of Freedom
in the Arab-MuslimWorld,"in Cultural Transitions,86-115. Khuriexplains that in Hanafi'sview of history, "residuespile up"over the centuries, with lower levels acquiringgreat authoritativeness.Controlover
meaning has been exercised by a self-appointed group that has continued to exercise its power over the
long course of history in Islamic societies. In a dialectical relationship, the Ash'arite-Ghazalian conceptions exercise their hold over the social group monopolizing power in society, and the social group in turn
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strengthensits monopoly of control over the thought by acting as sole gatekeepers to this thought, termed
the turath.
65Hanafi, Min al-'AqTdaila al-Thawra, vol. I, 35, 75, 211.
66Ibid., 5.

67Ibid., 223.
68Hanafi, al-Turath wa al-Tajdid (Cairo: al-Markaz al-'Arabi li-al-Bahth wa-al-Nashr, 1980), 15.
69"Thetext does not change in meaning, the interpretermakes it speak in accordance with his wishes.
The essential thing is the current reality, for it is what gives the text its purportand its content. Instead
of analyzing reality, itself and its constituent elements, there is a reliance on the proof of authority in a
society in which the text is a source of authority";Hanafi, Min al-'Aqida ila al-Thawra, vol. V, 229.
70Ibid., 1:79.
7'Ibid., 33.
72Ibid., V:387-88.
73Qutb speaks of a "new leadership" (qivdda jadida) of the "organic dynamic fusion" (tajammu'
haraki Cudwi)-that is, of the vital Muslim masses; Ma'alim fi al-Tariq, 49.
74The use of seemingly modern concepts by scripturaliststo vindicate scripturalistends is stressed in
the recent work of Serif Mardin. For example, see his intellectual biography of Said Beddiuzzeman
Nursi, Islam and Social Change in Turkey(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); also,
Mardin,ed., Cultural Transitionsin the Middle East. Also, see Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People, and the
State, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1994).

